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      Introduction 
Seiichi Fukui and Yonosuke Hara
  More than two decades have passed since the various rural development projects, uch as 
the introduction and diffusion of high-yielding varieties of rice and land reform programs, 
have started to be implemented in the Philippines. 
 These projects are said to have brought about drastic changes in the socioeconomic 
structures of the rural communities of the Philippines. As we search for future direction of 
structural change in rural villages in the Philippines as well as rural development policies in 
the countries ofsouth Asia and Africa, it is essential that we examine and analyze the agrarian 
structure characterized by landlordism and traditional rural institutions, whether they have 
changed and if so how. 
 This report is acompilation of the results of investigations conducted inrural villages in 
the Philippines by researchers from a number of different disciplines, including cultural 
anthropology, sociology, and economics, from their respective perspective inthe fields of 
their interest. 
  Before broaching the subject, we feel it would benefit the readers toprovide abrief summary 
concerning the history, introduction and results of the green revolution and agrarian land 
reform as a way of introduction toeach paper in the report. 
 The population in the Philippines increased at the high rate of three percent per year 
during the 1950's and 60's. By the late 1950's, uncultivated land had disappeared sothat 
during the 1960's and 70's the fragmentation f farm land had progressed. On the other 
hand, economic development during the 1950's and 60's was relatively high, and coupled 
with the high population growth, the demand for food increased rapidly. As the shortage of
food became increasingly serious, the government introduced and disseminated modern 
technologies forfood production featuring high-yielding varieties ofrice and use of chemical 
fertilizer and pesticides. 
 A history of the Philippines reveals that he process of developing commercial farming 
since the eighteenth century had taken the form of landlordism. Even at present a characteristic 
social structure r flects astrongg sense of unfairness with the wealth concentrating in a few 
rich families. Moreover, the Philippines had one of the highest rates of tenant farmers in all 
of Asia, particularly inthe rice-growing areas of Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog. Share
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tenancy was quite common in rice farming and levels of land rent were extremely high 
which forced the tenant farmers and their families to a life of poverty. On the other hand, in 
the sugarcane growing areas of Negros, the gap between the rich owners of haciendas often 
greater than one hundred hectares and the poor farm laborers was especially notable. 
  These problems of poverty in rural villages were seen as potential causes of agrarian 
unrest. In order to cope with the economic risis in the mid-1960s, guerrilla ctivists who 
agitated in support of war in Vietnam and the separatist activities of Muslims in Mindanao, 
the developed countries of the West and the World Bank rapidly increased economic 
development assistance tothe Philippines. A large portion of that development assistance 
was spent on agrarian reform in rice-growing areas and development and diffusion of modem 
rice growing technologies in order to eliminate the unrest in the rural areas which was 
considered as being at the root of the social instability. 
  The diffusion of modem rice technologies rested on two main strategies; namely, the 
construction ofirrigation facilities and implementation of tenant support program known as 
Masagana 99. Implemented first in 1973, Masagana 99, the Rural Financial Policy program, 
provided low-interest, no-security loans to beneficiaries u ing the new farming technologies. 
  The irrigated acreage increased from 960 thousands hectares in 1965 to 1.906 million 
hectares in 1985. The number of rice farmers receiving financial assistance amounted to 
forty percent of all rice farmers, thus contributing tothe diffusion of new rice technologies. 
As a result of the dissemination f high-yielding varieties of rice, the yield doubled. This 
does not imply, however, that he high-yielding varieties were used throughout the country, 
the yield reflected the state of irrigation, in other words, where there was sufficient irrigation, 
yield was high. 
 Another objective of the Masagana 99 plan was to support the tenant farmers who were 
beneficiaries of the earlier agrarian land reform. 
 Reform plans had been revised many times beginning with the Agrarian Reform Law of 
1955 to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) enacted uring the Aquino 
administration. I  this report, we will focus on the agrarian reform conducted under Martial 
law during the Marcos administration a d the CARL under the Aquino administration. 
 The Agrarian Land Reform carried out under the Philippine Presidential Decree of 1972 
targeted rice or corn producing areas. At the first stage, the reform program aimed at conversion 
of share tenancts o lease holders or amortizing owners. In 1975, the Secretary of Agrarian 
Reform Ministry proclaimed a Decree under which land owners who held more than 7ha but 
less than 24 ha were allowed to hold plots of not more than 7ha in tenancy. Lands that remained
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rented under the 7 hectares ceiling were converted from share tenancy to fixed rent contracts, 
with regulated levels of rent. 
  The land area where the transfer of land title was actually implemented was sixty-six 
percent of target area for land transfer program, and the transfer program from share tenancy 
to lease holding was carried out in areas in excess of the target, indicating that this agrarian 
land reform program was comparatively more successful than earlier programs. It must be 
noted, however, that small land owners with less than seven hectares of land were excluded 
from the program, and moreover, eighty percent of the target land owners who had openly 
resisted land reform programs represented small and medium landlords owning between 
seven to 24 hectares. This meant that the agrarian reform was less thorough than those in 
northeastern Asia. 
 The Aquino administration that came into power following the People Power revolution 
in February 1986 enacted comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law RA 6657 in 1988. This law 
was much more comprehensive, expanding the target from rice and corn farm lands to 
commercial crop lands, such as sugarcane, as well as to fish ponds and plantations owned 
and operated by multi-national enterprises. It also expanded the beneficiaries to include 
farm laborers in addition to tenant farmers. However, due to the extensive scope of the plan 
and the insufficient provisions for financing its implementation, resistance from the land 
owners, stronger compared to that under the Marcos administration, as well as many loopholes 
in the legal document prevented it from being effectively implemented. It must be noted that 
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, CARP is not advancing under the present 
Ramos administration either. 
 As mentioned above, the diffusion of modern rice technologies and agrarian land reform 
covered a wide area during the Marcos administration changing the the relationship between 
land owners and tenants which had regulated the traditional agrarian structure and traditional 
rural institutions. As a result productivity increased and improved the income level of the 
farmers. In non-irrigated or not well irrigated areas, however, even when new technologies 
were introduced, they did not lead to increased productivity. In these areas, the small and 
medium land owners strongly resisted the agrarian reform, traditional agrarian structures 
remained strongly entrenched and the conversion from the prohibited share tenancy to lease 
hold was not successful. With respect to CARP formulated by the Aquino administration, 
the land transfer involving land from sugarcane haciendas to laborers and peasants has not 
succeeded with the exception of very few cases. 
 The first part of the report focuses on the change in the landlord-tenant or landlord-farm
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laborer elations as a consequence of the agrarian reform implemented by the Marcos regime 
and the CARP implemented under the Aquino administration and the process of the landed 
farmers and laborers achieving a self sustainable development. 
 Chapter One elucidates, through a long-term field observation, the process of development 
of the ex-tenants who benefited from the dismantling of rice hacienda by the Marcos Agrarian 
Reform. We see how former owners (absentee landlords) were stripped of their land, and 
how the encargado (superintendent) and katiwalas (managers) were forced to give up their 
positions, how some formerly poor tenants were able to utilize the high-yielding varieties of 
rice, irrigation, and commercial crops that were introduced together with the land reform to 
acumulate wealth and move into the rich class. The process is described through detailed 
accounts of individual life stories. Conclusions are drawn by examining the conditions that 
led these beneficiaries of the agrarian land reform to become self-sustaining. 
  Generally speaking, the Aquino administration CARP program, never came close to 
reaching the goals it set out to achieve. 
  Chapter Two, examines thesugarcane producing area in Negros, where despite absence 
of agrarian land reform a major change in patron-client relations took place as a result of the 
abandonment of haciendas due to their poor management. A variety of creative hacienda 
management by the laborers is reported. A detailed observation is made of a successful case 
in which the landlord voluntarily transferred the ownership of his hacienda to the laborers 
who decided to manage it through a cooperative. Interestingly, the examination reveals that 
while the landlord-laborer relations appear to proximate relationship between a management 
consultant and members of the cooperative, in reality, however, they have not overcome the 
conventional patron-client relationship. The economic structural change in rural communties 
cannot be grasped simply through the change in the landowner-tenant relationship. 
 In the second part of this report, an analysis of the change in rural economic institutions 
such as tenancy contract, labor contract and informal rural credit market, brought about by 
Green Revolution and agrarian reform is conducted from an economic perspective. 
 In areas where through the introduction of modem rice production technologies profits 
increased ramatically and through agrarian reform the transfer of land title was carried out, 
new rural institutions emerged that had never been observed there before. 
 Chapter Three examines the increasingly popular employment of sharecropping permanent 
labor in Central Luzon since the 1980s, and offers a hypothesis regarding the employers' 
choice in favor of a sharecropping permanent labor contract. It was assumed that farm families 
enjoying a large off-farm income opted for this type of contract in order to encourage greater
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motivation of the laborers. Empirical examination proves that a high factor intensity is 
achieved under a sharecropping arrangement. This contractual rrangement is profitable for 
a landowner who faces a high opportunity income. 
  Chapter Four analyzes the emergenceof sangla, aland-pawning contract, which became 
common in the 1980s in progressive rice-farming areas of Inner Central Luzon and Panay. 
The chapter presents a conceptual model concerning the contractual choice of sangla and an 
empirical test of the model. From these studies, the following results are elucidated. 
  (1) Sangla contracts became more common in regions where increases inrice yields had 
been achieved and high-salaried job opportunities had increased. 
  (2) The typical money stream does not flow towards mall-scale farmers from large-scale 
farmers. Rather, it was common in the area of study that small-scale farmers engaged in 
high-salaried off-farm jobs loaned their surplus funds to large-scale farmers. 
  (3) Sangla contracts were chosen by income-maximizing farmers, on the basis of rationality 
irrespective ofreform law restrictions. 
  As we have seen, in areas where the Green Revolution and Agrarian Land Reform were 
successful, decisive changes in the rural institutions can be seen. However, in areas where 
rice productivity did not increase and where agrarian land reform did not progress, the 
traditional rural institutions continues to persist. 
  Share tenancy, prohibited by the agrarian land reform law, continues to be made, especially 
where kinship relations between land owner and tenant existed. In Chapter Five, analysis of 
a household survey from the Philippines hows that he behavior of sharecroppers having a 
kinship relationship with their landlord is not affected by the terms of the contract, while the 
behavior of the other sharecroppers is restricted by the contractual terms. In fact sharecropping 
enables an efficient resource allocation and is a preferred choice among the kin. Kin landlords 
indeed help or are expected to help more frequently in case of emergency than the other 
landlords, and they do so with a wider range of instruments, providing an incentive for 
cooperative behavior in sharecropping contracts among kin. 
 Although much formal financial assistance has been provided to farmers after the agrarian 
land reform and the diffusion of new technologies, it has not contributed tomitigating credit 
rationing. Traditional informal finance still plays an important role in the rural credit market. 
In Chapter Six, the attention ispaid to the Philippine rural credit market where although the 
high interest rates and credit rationing are characteristics, it iscommon for low- interest rates 
and no-security loans to be agreed upon through personal ties. The authors postulate that he 
lower interest rates are quite common because the lender hopes to induce the borrower to
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avoid defaulting. First they proved that the reciprocal credit contract may be optimal and 
sustainable as a non-cooperative equilibrium. Second, they showed that personal relations, 
assets and income are important determinants of a credit contract in an informal credit market, 
by using Tobit type empirical model.
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